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AND 
ELIZABETH SPELKE 
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
While endorsing Gopnik's proposal that studies of the emergence and modifi- 
cation of scientific theories and studies of cognitive development in children are 
mutually illuminating, we offer a different picture of the beginning points of cog- 
nitive development from Gopnik's picture of "theories all the way down." Human 
infants are endowed with several distinct core systems of knowledge which are 
theory-like in some, but not all, important ways. The existence of these core sys- 
tems of knowledge has implications for the joint research program between phi- 
losophers and psychologists that Gopnik advocates and we endorse. A few lessons 
already gained from this program of research are sketched. 
1.  Introduction.  Are studies of the emergence and modification of scientific 
theories and studies of cognitive development in children mutually illu- 
minating? Gopnik argues that they are, because cognitive development in 
children is driven by the same processes of constructing, revising, and 
replacing theories as those at work in scientists. Gopnik's argument, if 
right, has significant implications for practitioners both of cognitive sci- 
ence and of philosophy of science. Cognitive scientists would have to ac- 
cept that they face the same difficult analytic challenges as do historians 
of  science,  such  as  distinguishing  between  incremental acquisition  of 
knowledge, on the one hand, and conceptual change, on the other, and 
understanding how  genuinely new concepts  emerge. And  philosophers 
would have to accept that many age-old problems about theory change 
and the origin of concepts are amenable to new avenues of empirical study. 
Indeed, the developing child might provide a particularly  illuminating case 
study of theory development and theory change, revealing the central cog- 
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nitive processes  of  human  beings  (including scientists) freed from the 
wealth of specific knowledge, methods of data collection and analysis, and 
traditions that clutter any actual scientific enterprise. 
For analogies between the child and the scientist to be fruitful, however, 
one must specify what aspects of cognitive development depend on the 
emergence of, or change in, intuitive theories. Clearly, not all children's 
knowledge  stems from theories and not  all changes in knowledge and 
performance depend upon theory change. Most developmentalists would 
agree that the cognitive resources of the child include many structures  that 
are not  usefully categorized as theories, such as schemas, scripts, lists, 
prototypes, and other representations that arise and change during cog- 
nitive development. Children learn the course of events in a restaurant, 
the prototype of an elephant, and the sequence of the alphabet, for ex- 
ample, and these achievements must be distinguished somehow from pro- 
cesses of theory construction and revision. Moreover, most developmen- 
talists would agree that a variety of mechanisms produce cognitive changes 
in children. Maturational processes, for example, yield increases in rep- 
resentational, memory, and attentional capacity, and in executive func- 
tion,  and all of  these increases have an impact on children's cognitive 
functioning. Parameter setting mechanisms appear to play a role in lan- 
guage acquisition. If a theory of cognitive development must admit rep- 
resentational structures that are not theories and engines of cognitive de- 
velopment  that  are not  processes  subserving theory  change,  then  the 
research program Gopnik advocates requires developing the analytic and 
empirical tools for establishing what is, and what is not, an instance of 
theory change. 
Most  important, some of the cognitive achievements of children and 
adults do not result from processes of theory change, we believe, because 
they do not result from changes of any kind: they depend on core cognitive 
systems that emerge early in development and remain constant thereafter. 
Indeed, core knowledge systems may underlie the very phenomena on 
which Gopnik focuses. In our commentary, we sketch a picture of early 
cognitive development which gives pride of place to these core knowledge 
systems and we discuss implications of this picture for the collaborative 
research project Gopnik advocates. We focus on the "theories all the way 
down" aspect of Gopnik's view. In contrast to Gopnik, we suggest that 
children's initial cognitive endowment consists of a set of innate core sys- 
tems of knowledge which have some, but not all, of the properties of later 
developing intuitive theories and scientific theories. Most importantly, the 
mechanisms by which these core systems arise during early development 
are distinct from those that underlie theory construction later in childhood 
and in the history of  science. If we are right, then the study of  initial 
knowledge does not directly illuminate of the processes of knowledge de- 
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velopment in science. We conclude by suggesting where one should pursue 
the analogy between child and scientist and we offer a few lessons that 
have already been learned, we believe, in the course of such work. 
2.  Core Knowledge. There are two very different views of cognition and 
its relations to knowledge acquisition: 1) human cognition depends on a 
single, general-purpose, theory-forming capacity; and 2) human cognition 
builds on a set of domain-specific systems of knowledge (see Carey and 
Gelman 1991, Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994). The domain-specificity view 
emphasizes the links between cognition in humans and in other animals, 
and the links between cognition, perception, and action. As is often noted, 
the highest cognitive feats of animals, such as the dance of the bees, the 
web of the spider, the songs of birds, and the alarm calls of monkeys, are 
not the products of a general-purpose intelligence, but of domain-specific, 
task-specific cognitive systems. Similarly, the perceptual and action ca- 
pacities of humans result not from one general-purpose system for per- 
ceiving or acting, but from the orchestration of distinct, specialized sys- 
tems for perceiving different kinds of environmental properties (e.g., color, 
depth, melodies, etc.) and for engaging in different patterns of activity 
(e.g., reaching, grasping, locomoting,  scanning a scene). Studies of early 
cognitive development suggest to us that human cognition is built upon 
structures that are just as specific as those that underlie animal cognition, 
human perception, and human action. Just as humans are endowed with 
multiple, specialized perceptual systems, so we are endowed with multiple 
systems for representing and reasoning about entities of different kinds. 
These studies suggest that there are at least four core conceptual systems 
encompassing knowledge of objects, agents, number, and space. Each sys- 
tem of knowledge applies to a distinct set of objects and phenomena. For 
example, knowledge of physical objects applies to the behavior of material 
bodies, and knowledge of agents applies to the actions of people and an- 
imals. More deeply, each knowledge system is organized around a distinct 
set of basic principles which enable infants to identify the entities in the 
domain  and  constrain  reasoning  about  those  entities.  These  early- 
developing, domain-specific, and task-specific systems of knowledge allow 
infants to solve a host of immediate and pressing problems without having 
to test out a large space of possible solutions in advance. 
Consider infants' representations of physical objects. By 4 months of 
age,  infants  represent the  boundaries, internal connectedness,  and  oc- 
cluded positions and motions of objects in accord with three spatiotem- 
poral constraints on objects' behavior: objects move cohesively (maintain- 
ing their connectedness and boundaries), continuously (without jumping 
from one place to another or passing through other objects), and on con- 
tact with other objects (distinct objects do not interact at a distance; see 
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Spelke and Van de Walle 1993). From a very early age, these principles 
guide infants' inferences about hidden events. For some flavor of the ev- 
idence in favor of these claims, consider the following phenomenon sug- 
gesting that 6-month-olds' reasoning about the motion of objects is guided 
by the principle of contact. If infants of this age see one object roll behind 
a screen toward a partially visible, stationary object, which then begins to 
move in the same direction, they infer that the first object hit the second 
one. This inference is shown by their increased looking time (a reaction 
to novel or unexpected events) if the screen is removed to reveal an event 
where the first object stops short of the second before the second goes into 
motion (Ball 1973, Spelke et al. 1995; see Kotovsky and Baillargeon 1994 
for evidence of this effect at 3 months, and see Baillargeon 1993, 1994, for 
reviews of many further studies showing that infants under 3 months rep- 
resent hidden objects and make inferences about their hidden motions). 
Are the systems of  knowledge that underlie these inferences like the 
theories of scientists? If, as Gopnik indicates, a theory is at heart a rep- 
resentational structure  that embodies causal notions, licenses distinct types 
of explanations, supports distinct systems of predictions, and reflects  basic 
ontological commitments, then, contra Gopnik, research on infants leaves 
this question supremely open. Further, young infants' knowledge struc- 
tures differ from later developing intuitive theories and scientific theories 
in four salient respects. 
First, the means by which scientists identify the entities in the domain 
of a theory are highly indirect and are often dependent upon technology 
that is deeply theory-laden (e.g., cloud chambers, chemical tests, spectral 
analysis, balance scales). In contrast, the principles that determine and 
guide reasoning about the entities in core systems can be read off spatio- 
temporal analyses of perceptual input. The inferences infants make about 
hidden objects (e.g., permanence, contact causality) have the same infor- 
mational content as the output of spatiotemporal analysis of the percep- 
tual array. For example, infants, like adults, perceive mechanical causality 
directly when  the  spatiotemporal conditions  for  Michotte's  launching 
events are met (Michotte 1963, Leslie 1988, Oakes 1994), and it is exactly 
this sort of contact causality that is inferred in the hidden events of the 
Ball studies cited above (Ball 1973, Spelke et al.  1995). For another ex- 
ample, infants and adults analyze self-generated motion and patterns of 
contingent reaction between entities as evidence for intentional, goal di- 
rected action (Gergely et al.  1995, Watson  1979). This one-step relation 
between spatiotemporal analysis as input and conceptual output is not 
generally true of later developing theories, intuitive or scientific. 
Second, the capacity for constructing and understanding scientific the- 
ories surely is uniquely human. In contrast, all the evidence currently  avail- 
able suggests that the four core cognitive systems found in human infants 
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are shared by other animals (see Hauser and Carey (in press) for evidence 
that infants and primates represent and reason similarly about objects, 
numbers, and intentional agents; see Hermer and Spelke (in press) for 
evidence that young children and other mammals construct similar rep- 
resentations of space; see Gallistel 1990 for an extensive review of evidence 
for animal representations of number and space). Consider again the ex- 
ample of object representation. Recent research  has investigated the object 
representations of 2-day-old chicks, presenting chicks with visual displays 
very similar to those used in studies of human infants. Like their human 
counterparts, chicks have been found to perceive the complete shapes of 
partly hidden objects and the existence and location of fully hidden ones 
(Regolin  and  Vallortigara  1995; Regolin,  Vallortigara, and  Zanforlin 
1995), and their object representations have been found to  depend pri- 
marily on an analysis of spatiotemporal relationships revealed over object 
motion  (Regolin  and  Vallortigara  1995, O'Reilly  and  Johnson  1994). 
These findings suggest that early developing cognitive systems in humans 
have a long evolutionary history. We note, by contrast, that such homol- 
ogies between human and animal representations have not been found for 
children's later developing theories such as intuitive biology,  matter, or 
cosmology. 
Third, theories are central knowledge systems widely available to guide 
reasoning and action. In contrast, the early expression of core knowledge 
systems is response- and task-specific. For example, some of the spatio- 
temporal analyses which allow infants to predict the future position of an 
object that moves from view do not serve as a guide to predictive reaching 
for the same moving object, and some of the principles guiding predictive 
reaching do not serve as a guide for extrapolating occluded object motion 
(see Spelke, von Hofsten, and Vishton  1994). The systems of object rep- 
resentation guiding perception vs. action continue to be distinct in adults 
(Milner and Goodale  1995), providing further evidence for task-specific 
core knowledge systems. 
Fourth, theories are always open to revision, including radical revision 
involving conceptual change or even abandonment. Core systems, in con- 
trast, are elaborated but not  revised: neither infants, nor children, nor 
adults engaged in commonsense reasoning ever give up their initial systems 
of knowledge. Of course, much knowledge is never revised during devel- 
opment (that the sun is high at noon, or that "b" comes before "c" in the 
English alphabet.) But core cognitive systems remain not only when they 
give rise to beliefs that are true and useful, but also when they do not. For 
example, the infant's representations of objects as cohesive, moving on 
spatiotemporally continuous paths, and subject to contact causality con- 
tinue to exist in adults and are not supplanted by later learning, even by 
learning classical and quantum mechanical theories that directly contra- 
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diet them (e.g.,  see Proffitt and Guilden  1990). Although  infants learn 
many new facts about the behavior of objects, their newly gained knowl- 
edge enriches core knowledge without overturning it. 
The core system view shares much with Gopnik's view, but differs from 
it in critical ways. Like Gopnik's initial theories, core systems are concep- 
tual and provide a foundation for the growth of knowledge. Unlike later 
developing theories, however, core systems are largely innate, encapsu- 
lated, and unchanging, arising from phylogenetically old  systems built 
upon the output of innate perceptual analyzers. These differences make it 
unlikely that the development of core systems engage the same processes 
as the development of intuitive theories in childhood or the development 
of scientific theories in the history of science. 
3.  Why the Distinction between  Core Knowledge  and Later Developing  The- 
ories Matters. In her writings (both the article under discussion here and 
Gopnik and Meltzof in press), Gopnik develops two examples of cognitive 
development which she treats as examples of theory change: developments 
within the concept of object during infancy and developments within the 
theory of mind during the early preschool years. We think it likely that 
both the concept of object and the concept intentional  agent are embedded 
in core systems of knowledge, and that development in each case depends 
on a mix of enrichment and maturation. If we are right, then philosophers 
seeking lessons about theory change in science from case studies of cog- 
nitive development should not look here. 
3.1  The object concept. Some of the most robustly replicated phenom- 
ena within developmental psychology have been interpreted to reflect con- 
ceptual change within the concept of object. If infants below age 7 months 
are reaching for an object that is placed behind or beneath a barrier, they 
cease reaching, as if they no longer believed that the object exists (Piaget 
1954). Even after infants succeed on this basic task, they make what has 
been come to be called the "A-not B error." After successfully retrieving 
an object hidden at place A, infants who see an object hidden at place B 
look again at A rather than B, as if they have learned an empirical gen- 
eralization, "look where you have found things before," and are not trac- 
ing the path of  an enduring object (Piaget  1954, Wellman, Cross, and 
Bartsch 1987). Phenomena such as these have been taken to show that our 
everyday theory of the world as composed  of objects that exist perma- 
nently, independently of our actions, is constructed slowly during the first 
two years of infancy. 
Gopnik believes that these developmental changes are instances of the- 
ory change, analogous to Darwin's construction of the natural selection 
theory of evolution. We do not. As we have already indicated, there is 
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overwhelming evidence for object permanence as young as 2 months of 
age in human infants (e.g., Baillargeon 1995) and 2 days of age in chicks 
(Regolin et al. 1995). For a flavor of the evidence that human infants are 
committed to object permanence, and (more strongly) to the principle of 
continuity  (objects  exist  continuously  and  move  on  connected  paths, 
whether visible or occluded), consider the following  phenomenon: two 
screens are placed on a stage, and the infant sees one object emerge from 
the left of the left hand screen and then return behind it, followed by a 
physically identical object emerging from the right of the right hand screen 
and then returning behind it. The object motion  is consistent with one 
object going back and forth behind the two screens, except no object is 
ever observed in the space between the screens. Adults,  guided by the 
principle of continuity, infer there must be at least two objects involved 
in this event, one behind each screen. So do 21/2-month-old  infants, who 
show a novelty reaction if the screens are removed and only one object is 
revealed behind them (Aguiar and Baillargeon 1996; for converging evi- 
dence, see Rochat and Hespos  1996, Spelke et al. 1995, Wilcox, Rosser. 
and Nadel  1994, Wynn 1992, Xu and Carey 1996). 
Of course, those of us who believe that the Piagetian phenomena do not 
reflect a different concept of object than that of adults owe an account of 
why infants fail to reach for hidden objects or commit A/not  B errors. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this commentary to discuss the many 
alternative interpretations of these errors, we note that the extensive lit- 
erature on this phenomenon suggests that developmental changes in object 
search have more to  do with the development of  action than with the 
development of object representation. In particular, children have been 
found to engage in A/not  B search patterns not only when an object is 
hidden but when an object is visible (Harris 1974) or when they view 
motions of covers over potential hiding places containing no hidden object 
at all (Smith and Thelen 1995). Further, there is evidence that develop- 
mental  changes  in  search patterns primarily depend  on  maturational 
changes in the brain structures subserving executive function, which per- 
mit means/end planning and inhibition of competing responses (Diamond 
1991). 
One source of evidence that casts doubt on the theory construction view 
of the development of object search is the robust finding that the devel- 
opmental progressions so consistently observed in human infancy between 
the ages 6 and 18 months also are observed during primate development 
(Antinucci 1989). For example, Diamond  (1988, 1990, 1991) has shown 
that the developmental changes involving the A/notB errors of infants of 
7 months  and beyond,  are mirrored, in parametric detail, by identical 
changes in 2- to 4-month old rhesus monkey infants. It is known that these 
latter changes are driven by maturation of frontal cortex (Goldman-Rakic 
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1987). Similar changes may occur at much younger ages in chicks, a still 
more precocial species (Regolin, pers. comm.). If such changes show an 
important analogy between the scientist and the child, they also show an 
important analogy between the scientist and the monkey or between the 
scientist and the chick. However, we think it unlikely that the chick's or 
the monkey's emerging abilities to search for occluded objects bear much 
relation to emerging scientific theories, e.g., to the processes underlying 
Darwin's construction of the theory of natural selection. 
3.2  Theory of Mind. The extended example of Gopnik's paper is the 
development of the theory of mind. Although the phenomena that mark 
the transition from 3- to 4-year-olds' reasoning about their own and oth- 
ers' actions are not in question, the interpretation of these phenomena is 
a much debated topic in cognitive science. Many have suggested that the- 
ory of mind is the product of a core knowledge system (see Leslie 1994, 
Fodor 1992, Sperber 1994), and several considerations favor this account. 
First, theory of mind reasoning has clear precursors in infants, who rep- 
resent human actions as goal-directed (Gergely et al.  1994, Woodward 
1996) and as guided by perception (e.g., Baldwin and Moses 1994). More- 
over, the 4-year-old's system of knowledge of mind would seem to be a 
(considerably) enriched version of the infant's system, not a radical over- 
turning of it. Theory of mind thus appears to depend on an early-devel- 
oping (possibly innate) system of knowledge that is elaborated over de- 
velopment, as are other core knowledge systems. Second, theory of mind 
reasoning shows response specificity: 2-year-old children who fail theory 
of mind tasks in which they must verbally predict what a given character 
will do or say may succeed at implicit versions of these tasks, in which 
they watch a series of events and anticipate (with eye movements or other 
behaviors) what a character will do  next (Clements and Perner 1994). 
Response-specificity, we have noted, is another hallmark of core knowl- 
edge systems. Third, neuropsychological evidence suggests there are de- 
velopmental disorders such as autism, in which development of theory of 
mind is selectively impaired (Baron-Cohen 1993), and Williams Syndrome, 
in  which  it  is  selectively spared (Karmiloff-Smith et  al.  1995, Tager- 
Flusberg 1994). The pattern of abilities and impairments in Williams Syn- 
drome pose particular difficulties for Gopnik's analysis of theory of mind. 
Children with Williams Syndrome begin to reason about beliefs, desires, 
and human actions at about normal ages (Tager-Flusberg 1994), yet even 
adolescents and adults appear to be unable to undergo any of the forms 
of conceptual change associated with theory building (Johnson and Carey 
1996). Domain-specific cognitive impairments are puzzling if one views 
the impaired abilities as products of a single, general theory-building ca- 
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pacity, but they are to be expected if those abilities depend on domain- 
specific, core systems of knowledge. 
4.  Where We Agree. In spite of the above disagreements, we have broad 
sympathy for the research program Gopnik advocates. We agree that the 
self-conscious, formal, social setting of developed science is no barrier to 
fruitful analogies between intuitive theories and scientific theories (see Ca- 
rey and Spelke 1994). We believe there is a deep analogy between cognitive 
development in children and in science in several well studied cases, al- 
though the cases we find convincing occur later in childhood than Gop- 
nik's examples: intuitive biology in the years 4 to  10 (Carey 1985, 1988, 
1995; Hatano and Inagaki 1994; Keil 1989, 1992, 1994), intuitive theory 
of matter in the years 6 to 12 (Carey 1991, Inhelder and Piaget 1941, Smith, 
Carey, and Wiser 1985), intuitive cosmology (Vosniadu and Brauer 1992), 
intuitive mathematics in elementary school children as they construct con- 
cepts of 0, infinity, negative numbers, and fractions (Gelman 1991), and 
intuitive theories of thermal phenomena and mechanics in adolescents who 
study physics (e.g., Carey 1986, Clement 1982, Wiser 1988b). In the re- 
maining pages of our commentary, we sketch some lessons from this lit- 
erature concerning both the challenges and the promise of the research 
program we and Gopnik endorse. 
4.1  Lesson I: Accretionism and Conceptual Change. The literature on 
cognitive development underlines the importance of distinguishing knowl- 
edge acquisition which involves enrichment of an existing conceptual base, 
on the one hand, and the acquisition of new concepts that depend on, and 
produce, knowledge restructuring. (By identifying cognitive development 
with theory change, Gopnik sometimes seems to blur this distinction, but 
we expect that she would agree that it can and must be made.) Those who 
endorse the existence of conceptual change hold that in at least some cases 
of theory change, some core concepts of the new theory (T2) cannot be 
expressed in terms of the original theory (T1) and vice versa (Carey 1988, 
1991; Hacking 1993; Kitcher 1988; Kuhn 1982). The nature, or even co- 
herence, of the distinction between conceptual change and knowledge en- 
richment has been a source of debate ever since the seminal work of Kuhn 
(1962) and Feyerabend (1962; see Suppe 1977, Davidson  1979). Never- 
theless, research on cognitive development supports the need for such a 
distinction, contributes to the analysis of it, and provides the groundwork 
for studies of the mechanisms of conceptual change. 
Conceptual changes in the history of science and in cognitive develop- 
ment take several forms. Perhaps the most common form is differentia- 
tion, in which the undifferentiated parent concept from T  no longer plays 
any role in T2. Examples include Galileo's differentiation of average from 
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instantaneous velocity (Kuhn  1977), Black's differentiation of heat from 
temperature (Wiser and Carey  1983), and the child's differentiation of 
weight from density (Smith, Carey, and Wiser 1985, Carey 1991). Another 
common form of conceptual change is the coalescence, in T2, of concepts 
which were considered fundamentally different kinds in T1. Examples in- 
clude Galileo's abandonment of the Aristotelian distinction between nat- 
ural and artificial motion (Kuhn  1977) and the child's uniting of animal 
and plant under the new concept, living thing (Carey 1985). Other forms 
of conceptual change involve the reanalysis of a concept's basic structure, 
such as the Newtonian reanalysis of weight as a relationship between ob- 
jects rather than a property of objects, or the child's reanalysis of number 
as those  entities that participate in, and result from, the operations of 
addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, rather than those en- 
tities that participate in, and result from, verbal counting (Gelman 1991). 
A final form of conceptual change rests on the analysis of concepts as 
having a core/periphery structure and involves changes in a concept's core 
structure, as when children come  to  explain object solidity in terms of 
properties of matter rather than properties of objects themselves (Carey 
1991). Carey (1988,  1991) discusses each  of  these types  of  conceptual 
change as they occur in children's cognitive development. 
We are not claiming that the difference between knowledge enrichment 
and conceptual change is sharp, for there are a variety of intermediate 
cases. Moreover, we do not believe, with Kuhn (1962) and Feyerabend 
(1962), that theories before and after conceptual change are radically in- 
commensurable (see Carey 1985, 1991; Kitcher 1988; Kuhn 1982; Hacking 
1993).  Rather,  the  case  studies  of  cognitive  development  enumerated 
above suggest that children's earlier and later theories bear the relation 
that Kuhn (1982) called "local incommensurability." Because not all chil- 
dren's concepts undergo change, the unchanging parts of their theories 
serve as frameworks for those that do  (just as in the case of historical 
development of concepts; Kuhn 1982; Kitcher 1988; Henderson 1989). 
Consider, for example, the changes within the ontologically central con- 
cepts person and animal between ages 4 and 10. Young infants and pre- 
schoolers have an elaborate concept person, the prototypical agent, as the 
literature already cited attests (for reviews, see Spelke, Phillips, and Wood- 
ward 1995, Leslie 1994, Wellman and Gelman 1992). Young children also 
conceive of  animals as agents, distinguish kinds of  animals, and accu- 
mulate extensive knowledge about different kinds of animals (Carey 1985, 
Mandler, Bauer, and McDonough  1991, Wellman and Gelman,  1992). 
Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that the preschooler's concepts ani- 
mal and person differ from the  10-year-old's and are embedded in very 
different intuitive theories (Carey 1985, 1988, 1994). According to  one 
analysis (Carey 1985), the core of the preschooler's concept animal is that 
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of a behaving being: indeed, animals for children of this age are funda- 
mentally deficient variants of the prototypical behaving beings, people. 
The young child understands and interprets the body in terms of the role 
body parts play in supporting behavior. That is, the preschooler's frame- 
work theory (Ti)  in which the concepts person and animal are embedded 
is a theory of mind or intuitive psychology rather than an intuitive biology. 
By age  10 or perhaps earlier, the child has constructed a new intuitive 
theory of biology  (T2), with animal and plant coalesced into the single 
ontological kind living thing (Carey 1985, Keil 1979) organized around the 
life cycle and the function of body parts in the service of maintaining life 
(see Carey 1995 for discussion). This new theory has been variously char- 
acterized as a vitalist biology (Hatano and Inagaki 1994) and as the con- 
tainer theory of the body (Crider,  1981). It is a new framework theory T2, 
an intuitive biology organized around the concept of the life cycle of or- 
ganisms and a view of bodily function as maintaining life. 
These changes within the concepts person and animal require changes 
in a host of interrelated concepts. Related conceptual changes include the 
differentiation of the preschooler's concept not alive into the adult's con- 
cepts dead, inanimate,  unreal, and nonexistent (Carey 1985, 1988; Lauren- 
deau and Pinard 1962; Piaget 1929) and the differentiation of the child's 
concept family into separate concepts biologicalfamily  and socialfamily 
(Solomon et al. 1996). Other conceptual changes include the reanalysis of 
death from a behavioral interpretation to include the collapse of the bodily 
machine (Carey 1985; Koocher 1974;  Nagy 1948, 1953), and the reanalysis 
of baby from small, helpless animal to reproductive offspring (Carey 1985, 
1988; Callanan 1995; Solomon et al. 1996). The core features of the con- 
cept species shift away from physical characteristics toward origins of the 
animal (Keil  1989, Johnson  1994). Finally, the concept person is reana- 
lyzed from prototypical behaving being to one-animal-among-many  (Carey 
1985). 
The above characterization of conceptual change within intuitive biol- 
ogy is supported by a varied array of empirical findings, from the spon- 
taneous questions children ask, to analyses of children's patterns of pre- 
dictions and inductive inferences, to  the explanations children give for 
what are, for adults, biological phenomena. Perhaps most convincing are 
cases where children's concepts trap them in contradictions that they can- 
not resolve. For example, Carey (1985) analyzes a 4-year-old's worries 
about how it is that statues are not alive, yet we can still see them, as 
reflecting the  undifferentiated concept  dead/inanimate/nonexistent.  The 
Florentine  Experimenters'  undifferentiated  concept  heat/temperature 
trapped them in comparable contradictions that they recognized but could 
not resolve (Wiser and Carey 1983, Carey 1991). 
The above characterization of conceptual change between the preschool 
525 SUSAN  CAREY AND  ELIZABETH SPELKE 
child's Ti  of animals, people, and plants, on the one hand, and the 7- to 
10-year-old's T2 is supported by a case study of abnormal development 
in people  with Williams Syndrome, a rare form of  mental retardation 
which spares many linguistic abilities in the face of impaired analytic and 
metaconceptual  skills (Johnson  and Carey 1996). Ten adolescents and 
adults with this syndrome were found to have extensive encyclopedic fac- 
tual knowledge of animals (e.g., the distribution of bodily characteristics 
across the vertebrate/invertebrate  distinction), a state of knowledge typical 
of young adolescents with verbal mental ages of 11. However none of the 
ten  subjects  had  undergone  the  conceptual  reorganization  described 
above; none had constructed T2. Their factual knowledge was still orga- 
nized in accord with the theoretical life concepts of preschool children 
(T ). The dissociation, in Williams Syndrome, between knowledge enrich- 
ment and conceptual change underscores the distinction between these two 
types of knowledge acquisition. 
4.2  Lesson II: Mechanisms Underlying Conceptual Change. Although 
case studies in the history of science and in cognitive development provide 
convincing evidence for the existence of conceptual change, deep questions 
remain about how  such changes take place. Because scientific theories, 
intuitive theories, and core systems of knowledge all provide principles 
that enable a reasoner to  identify the entities and phenomena in their 
domains and influence the interpretation of those entities and phenomena, 
reasoning within any of these systems can turn in a circle. It should be 
extremely difficult for a person who  reasons within the context  of one 
system of knowledge to discover entities and relations beyond that system. 
If the concepts in T1 are even locally incommensurable with those of T2, 
a reasoner should have extreme difficult constructing, or even understand- 
ing, T2. 
Supporting the analogy between intuitive theory building and scientific 
theory building are reports of children's often startling resistance to chang- 
ing their theories, even when a new theory is explicitly taught to them and 
when contradictions within their original theory are made manifest. For 
example, studies within the cognitive science of science education suggest 
that the intuitive theory of mechanics that students bring to the task of 
learning classical mechanics is a version of  the impetus theories of the 
Middle Ages (McCloskey 1983). Even after years of studying formal phys- 
ics, student understanding is still couched in the concepts of impetus the- 
ory rather than Newtonian concepts (e.g., Clement 1982; see Carey 1986 
for a review of this literature.) These observations suggest that the theory- 
based reasoning of students indeed turns in a self-perpetuating  circle. Nev- 
ertheless, successful theory change does  sometimes take place, both  in 
childhood  and in science, and, in our view, one of the most important 
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potential payoffs of the research program Gopnik calls for is the possi- 
bility of testing proposals concerning the processes resulting in the con- 
struction of genuinely new representational systems. 
Work on this problem is most advanced within the context of the lit- 
erature on science education (see, for example, Smith et al. 1988, Wiser 
1988a). But here we begin with the earliest case we know of in childhood 
development-the  earliest conceptual change within the domain of num- 
ber. We have noted that young infants show a variety of abilities to dis- 
criminate between arrays of objects that differ in number and to compute 
the results of simple additions and subtractions on those arrays (see Wynn 
1996 for review). This research suggests that infants have a system that 
represents the exact numerosity of small collections of objects, irrespective 
of other quantitative properties of the objects such as their size. This sys- 
tem cannot represent the numerosity of larger collections (above 3 or 4), 
probably because of limits on parallel individuation (Trick and Pylyshyn 
1994). The small number system appears to  represent an array of  two 
objects as "an object and another object" rather than as "two objects" 
(Uller et al. 1996). Extensive research on animals (see Gallistel 1990) and 
some research on young children (e.g., Rodriguez and Spelke in prepa- 
ration) suggests that infants also have a system for representing approxi- 
mate numerosity. The approximate system has a much higher (and un- 
known) upper bound on set size. It does not, however, represent the exact 
numerosity of these sets, and its representations of the approximate nu- 
merosity of collections  of  objects are not  wholly  independent of  other 
quantitative properties of the collection such as object size or density (for 
discussion, see Gallistel 1990, Spelke and Tsivkin in press). 
As  one would expect, given the domain- and task-specificity of core 
knowledge systems, these two representations of number initially appear 
to be quite independent of one another. That is, the infant appears to have 
no concept number that connects them. From about 2 to 31/2  years of age, 
however, children laboriously learn verbal counting and come to under- 
stand both the point of counting procedures and the meanings of count 
words (Wynn 1990, 1992b). With this understanding, children appear to 
gain a concept of number that combines the virtues of the two core knowl- 
edge systems, allowing the representation of the exact numerosity of sets 
with no upper bound independent of other quantitative properties of the 
objects that compose them. It is this new representation that first appears 
to distinguish the number abilities of human children from those of ani- 
mals: although animals appear to possess both the exact and the approx- 
imate systems found in human infants, only human children (and perhaps 
animals explicitly tutored in symbolic counting systems) arrive at a system 
that combines the properties of these two systems (Boysen 1993, Hauser 
and Carey in press, Matsuzawa 1985, Pepperberg 1987, Rumbaugh and 
Washburn 1993). 
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The mechanisms underlying this conceptual change remain to be un- 
raveled, but existing research supports two suggestions about their nature. 
First, children's new understanding of number appears to result from their 
construction of a mapping between their two preexisting systems of num- 
ber representation: the exact system and the approximate system. Second, 
in this case, the cultural environment of the child (in particular, the lan- 
guage and counting routines she learns) appears to serve as an impetus to 
connecting these systems together. These suggestions can be generalized: 
new theories, and their associated domains and concepts, may often arise 
in children through the culturally guided combination of their preexisting, 
core systems of knowledge. 
Conceptual change in older children, adults, and scientists also may 
result, in part, from new mappings across systems of understanding: not 
just mappings across core systems, but across the constructed systems that 
result from earlier mappings. The application of new geometrical descrip- 
tions on the physical world (e.g., Galileo/Einstein), the discovery of new 
kinds of mapping between physics and number (see Duhem  1949, Ner- 
sessian 1992, Wiser 1988a, Smith et al. 1988), may have important things 
in common with the young child's construction of a new concept of num- 
ber. In all these cases, people may change their understanding by bringing 
together the principles that previously defined, and licensed inferences 
about, distinct sets of entities. By bringing together the principles inherent 
in distinct knowledge systems, children and adults may construct new sys- 
tems of knowledge, defining new classes of entities and licensing new pat- 
terns of reasoning and explanation. Indeed, it may be this process of bring- 
ing distinct knowledge systems together that most distinguishes human 
cognition from that of animals and the cognitive structures of older chil- 
dren from those of infants. 
We are not suggesting that all conceptual change results from combi- 
nations of existing systems of knowledge, or even that the ways young 
children combine the representations delivered by their core knowledge 
systems are wholly like the ways older children, adults, and scientists com- 
bine descriptions and explanations afforded by their current theories (al- 
though we view this as a possibility). The first uniquely human theories 
are constructed from different materials than scientific theories, so they 
are unlikely to be as like them as are later theories in childhood. We do 
suggest that processes for combining the representations from domain- 
specific systems of knowledge provide one potential mechanism of theory 
development and conceptual change and that studies of young children 
provide a promising means to study these processes. 
4.3  Lesson III. The Unity of Science. In making this suggestion, we may 
appear to be advocating a view with absurd consequences. The essence of 
528 SCIENCE AND  CORE KNOWLEDGE 
science (and all rational thought) would seem to be its unity: a scientist 
who  seeks to  construct a new explanation for some phenomenon may 
draw for inspiration on anything that he or she knows, irrespective of the 
domain-specific content of her knowledge. And a scientist seeking to eval- 
uate a new theory holds it to the test of saving all known phenomena, not 
just those narrowly in its domain. How could the cognitive processes of 
such a person rest on a set of domain-specific, task-specific, and response- 
specific autonomous cognitive systems? 
We are persuaded that the search for unifying explanations is a central 
feature of the scientific enterprise. We also believe this search is central to 
the young child: why else, for example, would 3-year-old children under- 
take the lengthy and difficult task of connecting together their well func- 
tioning large- and small-number systems. Why not allow each system to 
operate in blissful isolation from the other? Although all human thought 
ultimately is based on domain- and task-specific cognitive systems, hu- 
mans have both the ability and the propensity to map these systems to 
one  another so  as to  arrive at better and more encompassing ways of 
understanding what goes on around us. These mappings are a source of 
conceptual change, both in children and scientists. On this view, the unity 
of thought is best construed as a goal of human reasoning, always present 
although never perfectly achieved. 
If our suggestions are correct, then cognitive scientists and philosophers 
of  science may  gain  insights into  the  mechanisms of  scientific theory 
change by considering the mechanisms by which children construct their 
first uniquely human, theory-like systems of knowledge. In our view, the 
task of relating conceptual change in children to  conceptual change in 
science imposes a stringent research agenda on the cognitive study of sci- 
ence. First, one needs to study in detail the properties of humans' core, 
unchanging systems of knowledge as they emerge in infancy, as they func- 
tion in the intuitive thinking of adults, and as they continue to influence 
the thinking of scientists. Second, one needs to study in depth the processes 
by which new theories emerge from these knowledge systems in children, 
ordinary adults, and scientists. Students of cognitive development have 
begun to undertake the first task with studies of infants and young children 
and they have begun to undertake the second task with studies of science 
education and studies of theory construction among practicing scientists 
(e.g., Dunbar 1996). Bringing these studies together into a concerted in- 
vestigation of cognitive change is a central challenge for future research. 
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